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BREARD v. GREENE
REPUBLIC OF PARAGUAY v. GILMORE
In re BREARD, REPUBLIC OF PARAGUAY v. GILMORE
118 S. Ct. 1352 (1998)
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Angel Francisco Breard
("Breard"), "a citizen of Paraguay, came
to the United States in 1986. ' 1 Six years
later, the State of Virginia charged the
foreign national with attempted rape and
capital murder.2 Against the advice of his
attorneys, Breard took the stand in his
own defense and confessed to the crime.
He maintained his actions were the result
of a satanic curse placed on him by his
father-in-law Subsequently, the trial
court convicted Breard and sentenced him
to death.5 The Virginia Supreme Court
affirmed the convictions and sentences,
and the Supreme Court of the United
States denied certiorari.6
In August 1996, Breard filed a
motion for habeas corpus relief under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 with the federal district
court.7 Breard asserted, for the first time,
that his rights under the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations






Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352, 1353
5Id.
6 Id. at 1353-54.
7 Id. at 1354.
, The Vienna Convention, an international treaty
of which the United States and Paraguay are
parties, grants foreign nationals a right to contact
and communicate with their consular officials
violated.' Breard claimed that throughout
his arrest and detention, he had not been
informed of his rights to contact the
consul, nor had Virginia officials apprised
the Paraguayan Consul of Breard's
situation.1" Breard contended that because
of Virginia's failure to comply with the
Vienna Convention, his conviction and
sentence were invalid."
The district court rejected his
motion and held that the claim had been
procedurally defaulted by Breard's failure
to raise it in state court.12 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit agreed.13 The appellate court
when detained in a foreign state. Article 36 of the
Vienna Conventionprovides, inrelevantparts: "1.
With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular
functions relating to nationals of the sending state:
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate
with nationals of the sending state and to have
access to them. . . (b) if he so requests, the
competent authorities of the receiving state shall,
without delay, inform the consular post of the
sending state if, within its consular district, a
national of that state is arrested or committed to
prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in
any other manner.... The said authorities shall
inform the person concerned without delay of his
rights under this subparagraph; ... 2. The rights
referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be
exercised in conformity with the laws and
regulations of the receiving state.... .", 21 U.S.T.
77, T.I.A.S. 6820.





determined that Breard had not shown
cause that might excuse his procedural
default, noting that, "[iln no set of
circumstances has Breard made a showing
that he is actually innocent of the offense
he committed... or innocent of the death
penalty in the sense that no reasonable
juror would have found him eligible for
the death penalty."14 In the words of the
court, "no miscarriage ofjustice occurred
here .... Accordingly, Breard is entitled
to no relief on his Vienna Convention
claim."' Breard petitioned the United
States Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari.' 6
In September 1996, the Republic
of Paraguay, the Ambassador of
Paraguay, and the Paraguayan Consul
General brought suit in federal district
court against certain Virginia officials. 7
Each alleged violations of their rights
under the Vienna Convention and also
under the Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation ("Treaty of
Friendship") 8 between the United States




17 Breard, 118 S. Ct. at 1354.
Is U.S.-Para., 12 Stat. 1092 (Feb. 4, 1859).
Although the Vienna Convention requires
government officials to inform a sending state's
consular office only "[i]f [the arrestee] so
requests," Paraguay argued that under rights
extended to them under the Treaty of Friendship,
Virginia was required to notify Paraguayan
consular officials ofBreard's detention. This is so
because Article XII of the Treaty of Friendship
provides that "the diplomatic agents and consuls of
the Republic of Paraguay in the United States of
America shall enjoy whatever privileges,
exemptions and immunities are or may be there
granted to agents of any other nation whatever."
Since this right of mandatory notice to consular
officials had been extended to Britain, among
others, see, e.g., Convention Regarding Consular
and the Republic of Paraguay. 19
They claimed that Virginia had
violated these rights by failing to inform
Breard of his personal rights under the
agreement, and also by failing to inform
the Paraguayan Consulate of Breard's
arrest, conviction, and sentence.20 They
sought a declaration that Virginia
authorities had violated the Vienna
Convention and the Treaty of Friendship,
a declaration that Breard's conviction was
void because of those alleged violations,
and an injunction vacating Breard's
conviction and directing defendants to
abide by the treaties during any future
proceedings against Breard.2'
The Consul General of Paraguay
also asserted a cause of action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.22 He claimed deprivation
of the Consul General's right to have
Breard informed of his own personal right
to have the consul notified of his arrest
(under the Vienna Convention); and also
the Consul General's right to be
personally informed of Breard's arrest
Officers, June 6, 1951, United States-United
Kingdom, art. 16, 3 U.S.T. 3426 ("[a] consular
officer [of the sending state] shall be informed
immediately by the appropriate authorities of the
territory when any national of the sending state is
confined in prison awaiting trial or otherwise
detained within his district."), Paraguay claimed
the right of mandatory notice was, through the
Treaty of Friendship, extended to them as well.
See generally Republic of Para. v. Allen, 949 F.
Supp. 1269, 1271-72 (E.D. Va. 1996).
"9 Breard, 118 S. Ct. at 1354.
20 Id.
21 Republic ofPara., 949 F. Supp. at 1272.
2 This statute provides, in relevant part, "[e]very
person who... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or any other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured...."
(under the Treaty of Friendship). 23
The district court concluded that
since neither Paraguay, its ambassador,
nor its consul general were alleging a
"continuing violation of federal law," the
Eleventh Amendment24 prevented the
court from exercising subject-matter
jurisdiction over the suits." "The Fourth
Circuit affirmed on Eleventh Amendment
grounds. 26
The appellate court held that it did
not have subject-matter jurisdiction over
the suits because Paraguay could not
fulfill either of the two requirements to fit
within the narrow exception to Eleventh
Amendment immunity carved out by Ex
Parte Young.27 The violation was not
"ongoing," nor was the relief sought
"prospective." '2 Paraguay also petitioned
the United States Supreme Court for a writ
of certiorari.
On April 3, 1998, Paraguay
instituted proceedings against the United
States in the International Court of Justice
("ICJ").29  Paraguay alleged that the
United States had violated Article 36(b)(1)
3 Republic of Para., 949 F. Supp. at 1272.
24 "The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another state, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any foreign state." U.S.
CONST. amend. XI.
25 "Now that the defendants have given
Paraguayan officials access to Mr. Breard, they are
no longer in violation of the treaties." Republic of
Para., 949 F. Supp. at 1273.
26 Breard, 118 S. Ct. at 1354.
27 Id. See also Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908) (federal courts may exercise jurisdiction
over claims against state officials by persons at
risk of or suffering from violations by those
officials of federally protected rights, if (1) the
violation for which relief is sought is an ongoing
one, and (2) the relief sought is only prospective.).
2 Republic of Para. v. Allen, 134 F.3d at 627.
29 Breard, 118 S. Ct. at 1354.
of the Vienna Convention by failing to
inform Breard of his right to have the
Paraguayan consulate notified of his
arrest.
30
On April 9, 1998, the ICJ issued an
order, recommending that the United
States Supreme Court "take all measures
at its disposal to ensure that Angel
Francisco Breard is not executed pending
the final decision in these proceedings."31
HOLDING
On April 14, 1998, the United
States Supreme Court affirmed the lower
courts' decisions and denied the petitions
for certiorari and the applications for stays
of execution.32 The court held that: (1) by
not asserting his Vienna Convention claim
in state court, Breard had procedurally
defaulted this claim;33 (2) the Eleventh
Amendment barred Paraguay's suit
against Virginia, because the violation of
the consular notification provisions of the
Vienna Convention were not continuing;
34
and (3) the Paraguayan Consul General
was acting only in his official capacity and
thus could not bring suit against Virginian
authorities.35  Three justices dissented,
arguing that the court should grant the stay
of execution in order to deliberate more




31See International Court of Justice, Case
Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (Paraguay v. U.S.), Request for the
Indication of Provisional Measures, Order, Apr.
9, 1998.
32 Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352 (1998) (per
curiam).
33 Id. at 1354.
34 Id. at 1356.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 1356-57.
The Court concluded that two
reasons barred Breard from bringing his
claim. First, the Court followed closely
the reasoning used by the district court
and the appellate court by holdingthat the
rights granted under the Vienna
Convention were subject to and must be
exercised according to the laws of the
forum state.37 "[A]bsent a clear and
express statement to the contrary, the
procedural rules of the forum State govern
the implementation of the treaty in that
State."3 The Court stated that "[i]t is the
rule in this country that assertions of error
in criminal proceedings must first be
raised in state court in order to form the
basis for relief in habeas. Claims not so
raised are considered defaulted."'39 The
Court found that Breard had procedurally
defaulted on his claim by failing to
"exercise his rights under the Vienna
Convention in conformity with the laws of
the United States and the Commonwealth
of Virginia. Having failed to do so, he
cannot raise a claim of violation of those
rights now on federal habeas review."40
The second reason that prevented
Breard from raising his claim was the fact
that the United States Congress had
enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA")4' in
1996.42 This statute provides that a habeas
petitioner will not be afforded an
evidentiary hearing if he "has failed to
develop the factual basis of [a] claim in
State court proceedings .... 43
A subsequent-in-time rule had
37 Id. at 1354.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 1355 (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72 (1977)).
40 Id.
4' 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (Supp. 1998).
42 Breard, 118 S. Ct. at 1355.
43 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(2) (Supp. 1998).
been established by the Court in Reid v.
Covert.44 "[W]hen a statute which is
subsequent in time is inconsistent with a
treaty, the statute to the extent of conflict
renders the treaty null. 45  Since the
AEDPA was passed subsequent to the
Vienna Convention, its terms would
control. "This rule prevents Breard from
establishing that the violation of his
Vienna Convention rights prejudiced
hin.
' 4 6
The court further stated that even
if Breard's claim was "properly raised and
proven, it is extremely doubtful that the
violation [of the Vienna Convention]
should result in the overturning of a final
judgment of conviction without some
showing that the violation had an effect on
the trial."'47 Moreover, "[iun this case, no
such showing could even arguably be
made.
48
Turning to Paraguay's suits, the
court held that "neither the text nor the
history of the Vienna Convention clearly
provides a foreign nation a private right of
action in United States' courts to set aside
a criminal conviction and sentence for
violation of consular notification
provisions. ' 49  Furthermore, since there
were no continuing consequences
stemming from the failure to notify
Paraguayan officials ofBreard's situation,
44 Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. at 1355 (quoting
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (plurality
opinion)). See also Whitney v. Robertson, 124
U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (holding that if a treaty and
a federal statute conflict, "the one last in date will
control the other").
4' Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) (plurality
opinion).
46 Breard, 118 S. Ct. at 1355.
41 Id. (citing Arizona v. Fulninante, 499 U.S. 279
(1991)).
48 Id.
41 Id. at 1356.
the Eleventh Amendment provided a
separate basis for dismissal of Paraguay's
suits against Virginia. 0
Neither Paraguay nor its Consul
General could sue under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.51 Paraguay could not bring suit
because it is not a "person" as that term is
used in the statute, nor is it "within the
jurisdiction" of the United States.52 These
restrictions also barred the Consul General
from bringing suit, as he "[was] acting
only in his official capacity, he ha[d] no
greater ability to proceed under § 1983
than [did] the country he represents. 53
With respect to the pending
proceedings before the ICJ, the Court
stated that it was "unfortunate" that those
proceedings were still pending. However,
the Court noted that [the proceedings]
"might have been brought to that court
[the ICJ] earlier. '5 4 The Court hinted that
they would not interfere with diplomatic
relations, rather "this Court must decide
questions presented to it on the basis of
law."55 Nor could the ICJ "enforce" their
order of April 9.56 The Court implied that
foreign relations decisions are the purview
of the Executive Branch, who "may, and
50"ThatAmendment's'fundamental principle' that
'the states, in the absence of consent, are immune
from suits brought against them... by a foreign
state' was enunciated in Principality of Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329-30 (1934)." Id.
51 See supra note 22.
52Breard, 118 S. Ct. at 1356.
53"Any rights that the Consul General might have
by virtue of the Vienna Convention exist for the
benefit of Paraguay, not for him as an individual."
Id.
54 Breard, 118 S. Ct. at 1356.
55 Id.
56 The ICJ, being a world body, has no
enforcement mechanism for their orders. See
generally Breard, 118 S. Ct. at 1354 ("Breard
then filed a petition... in this Court in order to
'enforce' the ICJ's order.").
in this case did, utilize diplomatic
discussion with Paraguay. '57 Noting that
the Secretary of State had sent a letter to
the Governor of Virginia requesting a stay
ofBreard's execution, the court stated that
"[i]f the Governor wishes to wait for the
decision of the ICJ, that is his prerogative.
But nothing in our existing case law
allows us to make the choice for him."58
In separate dissenting opinions,
Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Ginsburg
focused on the amount of time used to
review this case. Justice Stevens pointed
out that under an ordinary review, the
Court would have had additional time to
consider the merits of the petitions.5 ' He
stated that the Court had been "deprived"
of the chance for "considered
deliberation" and saw "no compelling
reason for refusing to follow the
procedures that we have adopted for the
orderly disposition of noncapital cases.
Indeed, the international aspects of this
case provide an additional reason for
adhering to our established Rules and
procedures."6  Justices Breyer and
Ginsburg echoed Justice Stevens' concern
for the speed of the deliberation.61
Justice Souter, in a separate
statement concurring in the judgment,
opined that "the lack of any reasonably
arguable causal connection between the
alleged treaty violations and Breard's
conviction and sentence disentitle him to
7 Breard, 118 S. Ct. at 1356.
58 Id.
51 Breard, 118 S. Ct. at 1357 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Supreme Court Rule 13.1 states that,
"a petition for a writ of certiorari to review a
judgment in any case, civil or criminal, entered by
... a United States court of appeals.., is timely
when it is filed with the Clerk of this Court within
90 days after entry of the judgment."
60 Id.
61 Id. (Breyer and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
relief on any theory offered."'6
CONCLUSION
The ruling in this case will surely
have an impact on thousands of foreign
national felons, including up to sixty
individuals on death rows throughout the
country.63  Justice Souter's statement,
language from the majority opinion, and
several recent court decisions seem to
indicate that a foreign national who can
prove that his cause suffered because of
the failure of the state to notify his consul
might have a justiciable claim.61
The outcome in Breard does not
mean that foreign nationals are being
treated unfairly.65 On the contrary, it
implies that the Vienna Convention does
62 Id. at 1356 (Souter, J., concurring).
63 Frank J. Murray, Court: US. law outweighs
older pact. Foreign Countries can't sue states,
THE WASHINGTON TIMES, April 16, 1998, at Al.
See also Editorial, Ensure Access to Consulates,
THE LOS ANGELES TIMES, December 21, 1998, at
B4 ("Of the 74 foreigners on death row in the
United States, only four were told of their right to
contact their consulates after their arrest.").
' "Even were Breard's Vienna Convention claim
properly raised and proven, it is extremely
doubtful that the violation should result in the
overturning of a final judgment of conviction
without some showing that the violation had an
effect on the trial." Breard, 118 S. Ct. at 1355
(citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279
(1992)). See also United States v. Salas, 1998 WL
911731 (4th Cir. 1998) ("[petitioners] must
establish prejudice to prevail"); United States v.
Esparza-Ponce, 7 F. Supp.2d at 1096 (S.D. Cal.
1998) ("[D]efendant's motion fails because he
must show prejudice, and has failed to do so.").
6 On December 10, 1998, the Supreme Court
granted a stay of execution to consider a petition
for certiorari from a Canadian citizen scheduled to
die for a 1976 murder in Texas. Faulder v.
Johnson, 119 S. Ct. 614 (1998). Certiorari was
denied without comment on January 25, 1999.
Faulder v. Texas, 1999 WL 24803 (U.S. Tex. Jan.
25, 1999).
give additional rights to foreign nationals,
provided that they first show that there
was an ill effect on their trial. Proving
prejudice to their cause seems to be a
reasonable hurdle for foreign nationals to
clear, especially since a defendant already
enjoys the full protection of our criminal
system ofjustice.
This case could also impact United
States citizens traveling or working
abroad. Some three thousand United
States citizens are detained overseas every
year.66 Officials in foreign countries,
acting out of revenge, anger, or simply
hatred of America, could refrain from
notifying the American Consulate in their
country when an American citizen is
detained. Disregarding an order from the
World Court can be viewed by other
countries as a violation of international
law, and, as one commentator has noted,
"[tihese breaches of international law
decrease the likelihood that Americans
will have their rights respected abroad.
'67
Sensing that American credibility could be
hampered by Breard's death, Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright, in a letter to
Governor Gilmore asking him to stay
Breard's execution, stated that the
execution of Breard might hamper "[o]ur
ability to ensure that Americans are
protected when living or traveling
abroad.
'6
One positive result of this case and
the publicity it generated is that the
Secretary of State has provided to the
' U.S. Dept. of State Daily Press Briefing (Mr.
Rubin), 1998 WL 11307249.
67 Jonathan D. Tepperman, Texas law vs. Treaty
Execution of Canadian murderer could be trouble
for Americans abroad, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Dec. 15, 1998, at 9.
68 Letter from Madeleine Albright, United States
Secretary of State, to James Gilmore, Governor of
Virginia (Apr. 13, 1998) at 2.
Governor of every state pocket-sized
reference cards detailing steps to take
when arresting foreign nationals. This
step, properly implemented, should ensure
that every foreign national is apprised of
his Vienna Convention rights at the time
of his detention.69 Perhaps the simplest
and best way to prevent violations may be,
as some have suggested that the Miranda
warning should be accompanied by a
statement of foreign nationals' rights
under the Vienna Convention.
70
This case also illustrates the "clear
recognition that Virginia and other states
have consistently violated the Vienna
Convention, and that there appears to be
no effective remedy for these
violations."'" No remedy was written into
the Vienna Convention, however, and it is
not for the Court to write one into it. One
possible non-judicial remedy is holding
69 But see Peter J. Spiro, States that Flout World
Opinion May Incur Loss, NAT'L L.J., May 4,
1998, at A23, col. 1. Professor Spiro notes
"[t]hese federal efforts are unlikely to have much
effect--Vienna Convention guidelines have been
formally transmitted to the states no less than six
times since 1990."
70 But see James A. Deeken, A New Miranda for
Foreign Nationals? The Impact of Federalism on
International Treaties that Place Affirmative
Obligations on State Governments in the wake of
Printz v. United States, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 997, 1023 ("Even if an individual criminal
defendant can raise provisions of the Vienna
Convention in his defense as personal rights, this
alone is not enough to justify placing an obligation
on local police to inform aliens of their rights
under a Miranda framework.").
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the
United States Supreme Court enumerated warnings
which should apprise an arrestee of his rights
before he is questioned. Id. at 478.
" William J. Aceves, Application of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v.
U, S.). Provisional Measures Order, 92 AM. J.
INT'L L. 517, 523 (1998).
the state economically responsible for
perceived violations.72 States faced with
economic losses through boycotts would
be less willing to breach "international
obligations." In this way, foreign
countries, corporations, and consumers,
rather than "World Courts," could
persuade states to respect international
agreements.
Finally, the Court's ruling,
effectively ignoring the World Court's
(ICJ) order, could cause problems for
world judicial bodies such as the war
crimes tribunals on Rwanda and Bosnia,
which the United States government
supports.73 The proper forum for change
here, however, seems to be the legislature,
not the judiciary. It is the job of the
legislature to create laws, the role of the
judiciary to interpret laws. As the
Supreme Court stated, "[i]f the Governor
wishes to [stay an execution], that is his
prerogative. But nothing in our existing
case law allows us to make that choice for
him.-
74
Summary and Analysis prepared by:
Mark Trapp
72 See generally Peter J. Spiro, States that Flout
World Opinion May Incur Loss, NAT'L L.J., May
4, 1998, at A23, col. 1.
"3 See Brooke A. Masters, Albright Urges Va. To
Delay Execution, THE WASHINGTON POST, Apr.
14, 1998, at B1. Yale University law professor,
Harold Hongju Koh stating that the Supreme
Court's action in this case "will send a message
about our respect for international bodies. What
goes around comes around." See also Margaret A.
Jacobs, World Court Orders U.S. to Stay Va.
Execution of Paraguayan, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL, Apr. 10, 1998, at B2. George
Washington University international law professor
saying, "Dissing the [World Court] can only hurt
our credibility abroad."
'4 Breard, 118 S. Ct. at 1356.
